What Is Lateral Movement? How Hackers Quietly Spread Through Your Network (and How to Stop Them)

If an attacker gets into one computer on your network, the story isn’t over—it’s just getting started. Think of it like a burglar who sneaks in through a side window. They don’t grab whatever’s on the kitchen counter and leave. They look for the master keys, check which rooms are locked, and move from room to room until they reach the safe. In cybersecurity, that movement—quiet, purposeful, and often undetected—is called lateral movement.

This guide breaks down how lateral movement works, why it’s so effective, and how you can detect and stop it before serious damage happens. I’ll keep it clear, practical, and packed with examples you can learn from.

Let’s get into it.

Lateral Movement in Cybersecurity: A Plain-English Definition

Lateral movement is what attackers do after they’ve established a foothold in your environment. Their goal is to move from the first compromised system to other systems and accounts, escalate privileges, and eventually reach high-value targets—like domain controllers, cloud admin portals, or sensitive databases—without setting off alarms.

Put another way: initial access gets them in; lateral movement gets them what they came for.

According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, lateral movement is a tactic that includes techniques like remote services, credential reuse, and exploitation across internal systems. If you want a deeper dive into the catalog of techniques, see MITRE ATT&CK’s lateral movement page: MITRE ATT&CK: Lateral Movement (TA0008).

Why this matters: even strong perimeter defenses won’t save you if an attacker can pivot internally with ease. Most major breaches involve significant lateral movement before detection.

Why Attackers Move Laterally

Attackers move laterally to:

Find and access valuable data. Think file shares, databases, source code, email archives, backups.
Escalate privileges. They hunt for admin or domain admin rights to control the environment.
Establish persistence. They install backdoors or abuse legitimate tools to maintain access.
Evade detection. They blend into normal admin activity and use “living off the land” tools.
Reach the crown jewels. That might be a domain controller, an SSO provider, or a cloud management console.

The key takeaway: lateral movement is about persistence and privilege. It’s not random; it’s strategic.

How Lateral Movement Works: The Attacker’s Playbook

Most lateral movement follows a pattern. Here’s the flow you’ll see again and again.

1) Initial access – Phishing, stolen VPN credentials, exposed RDP, or a vulnerable web app. – Malware or an agent provides a beachhead on one system.

2) Internal reconnaissance – Enumerate users, groups, and systems (e.g., who has admin rights and where). – Map trust relationships and attack paths. – Tools and commands can be as simple as net, PowerShell, and LDAP queries—or specialized tools like BloodHound.

3) Credential access – Steal credentials from memory or disk (LSASS dumps, browser creds). – Replay password hashes or tickets. Harvest tokens and cookies.

4) Lateral movement – Use remote management tools (RDP, WMI, WinRM, SSH) to move to other systems. – Create or abuse services, scheduled tasks, or admin shares.

5) Privilege escalation – Abuse misconfigurations or vulnerabilities to become local admin, then domain admin. – Leverage delegation issues or weak service accounts.

6) Persistence and objective actions – Install implants, add backdoor accounts, modify GPOs, or abuse cloud app consents. – Exfiltrate data, deploy ransomware, or manipulate systems.

Here’s why that matters: stopping lateral movement isn’t about one silver bullet. It’s about reducing available paths, monitoring for abnormal behavior, and hardening identity, endpoints, and network controls.

Common Lateral Movement Techniques (and What They Mean)

Attackers mix and match these based on what they find.

Pass-the-Hash (PtH)
Reuses NTLM password hashes to authenticate without knowing the plaintext password.
Mitigations: restrict lateral admin rights, enable Credential Guard, and follow Microsoft’s guidance on mitigating PtH attacks. See Microsoft’s docs on Mitigating Pass-the-Hash and Credential Guard.
Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) and Overpass-the-Hash
Reuse or forge Kerberos tickets (TGT/TGS). Overpass-the-Hash converts an NTLM hash into a Kerberos ticket.
Mitigations: enforce strong Kerberos encryption, rotate KRBTGT, monitor for unusual ticket activity.
Kerberoasting
Request service tickets for accounts with SPNs, crack them offline if weakly encrypted.
Mitigations: use strong, long service account passwords or gMSA; monitor abnormal TGS requests.
Remote services and protocols
RDP, SMB (admin shares like C$), WMI, WinRM/PowerShell Remoting, PsExec, DCOM, SSH in mixed environments.
Mitigations: restrict where admins can log on, limit lateral admin rights, enforce MFA for remote access, segment networks.
Service creation and scheduled tasks
Create a new service or scheduled task on a remote machine to run attacker code.
Mitigations: monitor for new services (Event ID 7045), lock down who can create them.
Living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)
PowerShell, certutil, mshta, wmic—legitimate tools used for malicious purposes.
Mitigations: enable PowerShell Script Block Logging, Constrained Language Mode, AMSI integration, and EDR rules.
Token theft and impersonation
Steal access tokens to impersonate accounts (including SYSTEM or service accounts).
Mitigations: EDR controls, LSASS protection, minimize accounts with local admin.
NTLM relay and AD CS abuse
Relay captured NTLM auth to elevate privileges. Abuses in Active Directory Certificate Services can enable “shadow credentials.”
Mitigations: sign/seal LDAP, disable NTLM where possible, harden AD CS.
Golden Ticket and DCSync
Forge Kerberos tickets or simulate domain controller replication to dump secrets.
Mitigations: protect domain controllers, monitor for DCSync behaviors, tightly control who has Replicating Directory Changes rights.

If that felt like alphabet soup, it’s because identity and protocol weaknesses make lateral movement powerful. The defense is about sane defaults, segmentation, and continuous monitoring.

Real-World Breaches: Lateral Movement in Action

Theory is useful, but examples make it real. Here are high-profile incidents where lateral movement played a starring role:

SolarWinds (SUNBURST)
Attackers compromised the software update mechanism, then moved laterally within victims’ networks.
They gained privileged access, in some cases abusing SAML tokens to access cloud resources.
Reference: CISA Alert AA21-008A.
NotPetya
Spread rapidly through lateral movement. Used stolen credentials and exploited SMB vulnerabilities (EternalBlue).
Many organizations saw entire networks crippled within hours.
Reference: UK NCSC analysis of NotPetya.
Target (2013)
Attackers entered via a third-party HVAC vendor’s credentials, then pivoted to point-of-sale systems.
Classic example of using one foothold to reach sensitive segments.
Reference: KrebsOnSecurity on Target breach.
Equifax (2017)
After initial access via an unpatched Apache Struts vulnerability, attackers moved laterally to databases with sensitive consumer data.
Reference: U.S. GAO report on Equifax.

Lateral movement wasn’t an afterthought in these breaches. It was the main act.

How to Detect Lateral Movement Early

You can’t stop what you can’t see. The fastest wins come from collecting the right telemetry, baselining what “normal” looks like, and alerting on deviations.

Here’s a practical detection playbook:

Watch identity events
Flag logins from unusual sources, new geolocations, or impossible travel.
Alert on privileged logons from non-admin workstations.
Useful Windows events: 4624 (logon success), 4625 (failures), 4672 (special privileges), 4769 (Kerberos service ticket request), 4776 (NTLM auth).
Monitor process and service creation
Event 4688 (process creation) and 7045 (service installed) are high-signal.
Sudden use of PowerShell, wmic, sc.exe, or regsvr32 from non-IT users is a red flag.
Track remote execution and admin shares
Access to ADMIN$ or C$ from unusual hosts.
WMI or WinRM connections from machines that don’t usually act as admins.
Analyze east-west network traffic
Lateral sprawl: one host reaching many peers over SMB, RDP, LDAP, or WinRM.
Use NetFlow, Zeek, or EDR network telemetry.
Enable enhanced logging
Sysmon adds rich process and network details. Download from Microsoft: Sysmon.
PowerShell Script Block Logging captures commands and scripts executed. See PowerShell logging.
Use Sigma rules to translate detections across SIEMs: SigmaHQ.
Deploy canaries and honeytokens
Plant fake credentials, files, or shares that no one should touch. Alerts on access provide early warning. Low noise, high value.
Hunt with ATT&CK as a guide
Build detections by technique. Start with RDP misuse, suspicious service creation, Kerberoasting patterns, and credential dumping behaviors.
Reference: MITRE ATT&CK.

Pro tip: The best detection programs are iterative. Start small. Tune noise. Add one high-fidelity rule at a time.

How to Stop Lateral Movement: Practical Defenses That Work

Stopping lateral movement is about reducing attacker options and raising the cost of every step. Here’s a layered approach.

1) Identity-first security

Enforce MFA everywhere feasible, including VPN, RDP, and admin tools.
Implement a tiered admin model and Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs). Admins shouldn’t browse the web from the same device they use to manage servers.
Use unique local admin passwords with LAPS or Windows LAPS. See Windows LAPS overview.
Reduce or remove local admin rights for users. Least privilege is non-negotiable.
Harden authentication:
Prefer Kerberos with modern ciphers; minimize NTLM. Learn more: Microsoft NTLM overview.
Enable Credential Guard and LSASS protections where supported.
Rotate high-value secrets often (service accounts, KRBTGT).

2) Network segmentation and Zero Trust

Segment critical assets from user networks. Use firewalls and microsegmentation for east-west control.
Restrict remote management protocols (RDP, WinRM, SMB) to admin subnets.
Adopt Zero Trust principles: verify explicitly, use least privilege, assume breach. Learn the framework from NIST SP 800-207 and the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model.

3) Endpoint hardening and EDR

Deploy reputable EDR across endpoints and servers. Turn on behavioral protections.
Enable PowerShell Constrained Language Mode, Script Block Logging, and AMSI.
Disable SMBv1, lock down RDP, and patch relentlessly—especially protocol-level vulnerabilities.
Apply Attack Surface Reduction rules and block unsigned macros.

4) Active Directory hygiene

Remove unconstrained delegation and audit resource-based constrained delegation.
Use gMSA for service accounts. Avoid domain admins running services.
Monitor for DCSync and anomalous replication requests.
Review SPNs and lock down service account privileges to least necessary.

5) Monitoring and incident response

Pre-build playbooks to isolate hosts, expire tokens, and rotate credentials quickly.
Maintain offline, immutable backups. Test restoration regularly.
Practice tabletop exercises focused on lateral movement scenarios.

Quick-start checklist

Enforce MFA and conditional access for remote and admin access.
Reduce local admin rights; roll out LAPS.
Segment critical systems; restrict east-west RDP/SMB.
Deploy EDR; turn on PowerShell logging and Sysmon.
Audit service accounts and SPNs; rotate KRBTGT on a schedule.
Create canary accounts/credentials and alert on usage.
Hunt monthly for Kerberoasting, abnormal RDP, and new service creation.

For a grounded, data-driven view of how attackers operate, check the latest Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report.

Lateral Movement in Cloud and Hybrid Environments

Lateral movement isn’t just an on-prem problem. In cloud and hybrid setups, attackers “move” by pivoting across identities, roles, and connected services.

Common cloud pivot patterns:

AWS
Compromised access keys allow attackers to enumerate resources and assume roles in other accounts via STS.
Over-permissioned IAM roles become stepping stones.
Defenses: least privilege, session policies, CloudTrail + GuardDuty, MFA on root and sensitive roles. See AWS IAM best practices.
Microsoft 365/Azure AD
OAuth app consent abuse, illicit grant attacks, or compromised global admin.
Lateral movement via synced identities or hybrid connectors.
Defenses: Conditional Access, disable legacy auth, monitor risky sign-ins, consent governance. Learn more: Azure AD Conditional Access.
Google Cloud Platform
Service account key theft, broad roles (Editor/Owner), and cross-project role chaining.
Defenses: Workload Identity Federation, minimal roles, Cloud Audit Logs monitoring.
Cloud ATT&CK patterns
MITRE tracks cloud-specific techniques here: ATT&CK for Cloud.

Bottom line: identity is the new perimeter. Least privilege and strong conditional access controls are your best friends in the cloud.

Red Flags That Suggest Lateral Movement

Here are quick signals that should make you suspicious:

A user logs into multiple servers they rarely or never use.
RDP activity from a non-admin workstation or between two servers that don’t typically communicate.
Sudden creation of new services or scheduled tasks on critical hosts.
Unusual spikes in SMB traffic across the internal network.
Multiple account lockouts followed by one successful login.
New or rare PowerShell usage on servers, especially with encoded commands.
Kerberoasting patterns: lots of TGS requests for service accounts.
Access to admin shares (C$, ADMIN$) from unexpected sources.
Privileged groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins) membership changes outside maintenance windows.
Anomalous OAuth consents or new cloud admin roles granted without a ticket.

If you see one or two of these, investigate. If you see several, escalate immediately.

A Mental Model That Helps: Shrink the Attack Graph

Attackers look for shortest paths from a compromised node to high-value targets. Tools like BloodHound visualize these paths in Active Directory. Your job is to shrink the graph:

Remove unnecessary admin rights and risky group memberships.
Break long chains (e.g., workstations where domain admins log in).
Rotate and randomize local admin passwords.
Implement network controls that force authentication and authorization checks at every hop.

Fewer edges and fewer privileges mean fewer viable paths—and fewer late-night incidents.

You can explore AD attack paths and fix them systematically using community tools like BloodHound.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What’s the difference between lateral movement and privilege escalation? – Privilege escalation is about gaining higher permissions on the same system (e.g., user to admin). Lateral movement is about moving to other systems or identities. Attackers often escalate first, then move—or vice versa.

Q: Does MFA stop lateral movement? – MFA helps a lot, especially for remote access and admin sessions. But if tokens are stolen or sessions are hijacked, MFA alone isn’t enough. Pair MFA with least privilege, session controls, device trust, and robust monitoring.

Q: Which tools do attackers commonly use for lateral movement? – Common tools include Mimikatz, Impacket (wmiexec, psexec), Cobalt Strike/Brute Ratel, PowerShell Remoting, PsExec, WMI, and RDP. Many are dual-use admin tools, which is why context and baselining matter.

Q: How long does lateral movement take? – It varies. In some ransomware cases, attackers move from initial access to domain admin within hours. In stealthy espionage cases, movement may unfold over weeks or months. Reducing dwell time with strong detection is critical.

Q: Is lateral movement only a Windows/Active Directory problem? – No. Linux and macOS are also targeted, and cloud environments present new movement patterns via IAM roles and API tokens. That said, AD remains a prime target because of its central role in enterprise identity.

Q: What logs should I collect to detect lateral movement? – Start with Windows Security logs (4624/4625/4672/4688/4769/4776/7045), Sysmon logs for process/network details, PowerShell Script Block Logging, and network telemetry (NetFlow/Zeek). In cloud, enable CloudTrail, Azure AD sign-in logs, and equivalent audit logs.

Q: How can I test whether my organization is vulnerable? – Run an internal assessment using tools like BloodHound to map AD attack paths. Conduct purple team exercises aligned to MITRE ATT&CK, or hire a reputable penetration testing firm. Mandiant and similar firms share useful case studies: Mandiant resources.

Q: Is network segmentation still relevant in a Zero Trust world? – Yes. Zero Trust complements segmentation. You still need to restrict east-west traffic, especially around domain controllers, databases, and management planes. Identity policy without traffic control leaves gaps.

Key Takeaway and Next Steps

Initial access is the foothold. Lateral movement is the breach. The good news: you can make lateral movement hard and noisy by tightening identity controls, segmenting the network, hardening endpoints, and watching for the telltale signs.

Start this week with three moves: – Enforce MFA for all remote and admin access. – Roll out LAPS and reduce local admin rights. – Turn on enhanced logging (Sysmon, PowerShell Script Block Logging) and alert on new service creation and unusual RDP/SMB activity.

Want more practical security breakdowns like this? Keep exploring guides aligned to MITRE ATT&CK and Zero Trust best practices, and consider subscribing for future deep dives.

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