Cybersecurity and Elections: How Hackers Target the Vote

You walk into a polling place. You press a button or fill in a bubble. It feels simple. But behind that one vote is a web of databases, devices, networks, and people. That complex system now sits in the crosshairs of hackers, influence operators, and opportunists looking to cause chaos—or bend the story of the election itself.

If that makes you uneasy, you’re not alone. Elections are the foundation of democracy. In the digital age, they’re also prime targets. The good news? Election security has matured fast. The better news? You have more power to protect it than you might think.

In this guide, we’ll unpack how election hacking really works, what’s at risk, and the practical steps governments, tech teams, and voters are taking to safeguard democracy.

Let’s start with why elections attract attackers in the first place.

Why Elections Are Irresistible Targets for Hackers

Elections offer a rare mix of reward and fragility. The incentives are high. The tolerance for error is low. And the impact is global.

Here’s what makes them so attractive to adversaries:

High-leverage outcomes: Influence a close race and you can influence policy, markets, and geopolitics.
Psychological payoff: You don’t have to change votes to damage trust. Casting doubt is often enough.
Broad attack surface: Voter databases, e-pollbooks, voting machines, county networks, websites, and social media are all in play.
Many stakeholders: Local clerks, vendors, volunteers, campaigns, media, and platforms. Coordination is hard. Attackers exploit gaps.

Who are the attackers?

Nation-state actors seeking geopolitical advantage.
Cybercriminals looking for money or fame.
Hacktivists aiming to send a message.
Insiders or contractors with access and grievances.

The key point: attackers can succeed even without technical “superpowers.” A well-timed leak, a DDoS attack on a state website, or a viral falsehood can derail confidence. That’s the real prize.

How Modern Elections Actually Work (and Where the Risks Live)

It helps to visualize the election system as a chain. Each link is a target.

Voter registration systems: State or county databases that store eligibility and status.
Electronic pollbooks (e-pollbooks): Check-in devices used at polling places.
Ballot design and printing systems: Often county IT plus third-party vendors.
Voting equipment: Optical scanners, ballot-marking devices, or hand-marked paper ballots.
Election management systems (EMS): Software that programs ballots and aggregates results.
Tabulation and reporting: Local tallies roll up to county and state systems; unofficial results appear on websites.
Communications and logistics: Email, printers, radios, and transport that move people and materials.

A common question is: Are voting machines online?

In most U.S. jurisdictions, voting machines are not connected to the internet. That lowers risk, but it’s not a magic shield. Devices still interact with other systems via removable media and pre-election programming. That’s why strict chain-of-custody, software allowlisting, and hash verification matter. For myth-busting on what’s connected and what isn’t, see CISA’s Election Security Rumor Control pages: CISA Rumor Control.

Real-World Election Interference: What We’ve Seen

Let’s separate headlines from evidence. Here are patterns backed by credible sources:

2016 United States: The U.S. intelligence community assessed that Russia conducted a campaign of cyber operations and influence activity, including spearphishing political organizations and probing state election infrastructure. See the declassified assessment: ODNI 2017 ICA.
2017 France: Phishing and leaks targeted presidential campaigns, followed by rapid attempts to spread hacked materials online. DFRLab has analyzed these “hack-and-leak” patterns: Atlantic Council DFRLab.
2016 Illinois voter database: Attackers accessed registration data. The incident prompted broader reviews of state systems. Summaries appear in the U.S. Senate report on election security: Senate Intelligence Committee report.
2020 United States: Multiple foreign actors attempted influence operations. Authorities also saw efforts to intimidate voters via spoofed emails. For an overview, see the 2021 declassified assessment: ODNI 2021 Assessment.
2022–2023: DDoS attacks hit some election-related and state websites, slowing access to unofficial results pages. These disruptions don’t change votes but can fuel confusion.
Deepfakes in politics: Synthetic audio and video emerged in several countries to sway opinion or sow doubt. For research on the information environment, see Stanford Internet Observatory: Stanford Internet Observatory.

Two patterns stand out:

1) Most technical attacks aim at surrounding systems—campaigns, county IT, or public websites—rather than the tabulators themselves.

2) Disinformation is the multiplier. A minor glitch can be turned into a major narrative if people are primed to distrust.

The Biggest Cyber Risks to Elections

You’ll hear about hackers “changing votes on machines.” That’s the nightmare scenario. But the most common risks are simpler and often more effective.

Voter database compromise
Exposed personal data leads to identity risks and targeted misinformation.
Database outages cause long lines and provisional ballots.
E-pollbook failures
Misconfigurations or sync problems slow check-in.
A single device image with a bad setting can cascade across hundreds of tablets.
Ransomware on county networks
Elections rely on printers, file servers, badge systems, and email. If the county IT network is locked, logistics suffer.
Supply chain risk
Third-party vendors handle ballot printing, equipment maintenance, and support. A weak link there can affect many jurisdictions.
USB/removable media risks
If programming media are infected, malware can spread to isolated EMS systems.
Election Night Reporting (ENR) website disruptions
DDoS or defacement won’t change official results, but it can distort the public narrative in the critical first hours.
Insider threat
Rare but real. Poor access controls or single-person custody can enable tampering or data leakage.

To mitigate these risks, election offices lean on standards and audits. For technical baselines, see NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework: NIST CSF 2.0. For voting system requirements, see the U.S. EAC’s VVSG 2.0: EAC VVSG 2.0.

Disinformation: The Silent Partner of Cyberattacks

Think of disinformation as the accelerant. It turns sparks into wildfires.

How it spreads:

Coordinated inauthentic behavior amplifies narratives with fake accounts.
Algorithmic virality rewards outrage and novelty.
Journalist “hack-and-leak” traps push newsrooms to cover hacked materials before context catches up.
Deepfakes and “cheapfakes” lower production costs for convincing hoaxes.

Common tactics:

False claims about how, when, or where to vote.
Fake results graphics impersonating official accounts.
Bogus “whistleblower” leaks that get debunked too late.
Fabricated endorsements, speeches, or phone calls via AI-generated media.

Here’s why that matters: confidence is part of the result. If large numbers of people believe the process is broken, the legitimacy of the outcome suffers—even if the votes were counted accurately.

For best practices in countering information manipulation, see the EU’s initiatives on disinformation: EU Code of Practice on Disinformation and ongoing analysis at the DFRLab: DFRLab.

How Democracies Defend Elections: Layers, Not Silver Bullets

Security pros talk about “defense in depth.” Elections need it across people, process, and technology.

People: Training and Access

Mandatory phishing and social engineering training for staff and temporary workers.
Role-based access controls and background checks for those with system access.
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) on all accounts—email, cloud tools, and vendor portals.
Clear escalation paths: who to call, how to contain, how to document.

Campaigns are targets too. For a practical guide tailored to campaigns, see the Belfer Center’s playbook: Cybersecurity Campaign Playbook.

Process: Paper, Audits, and Transparency

Paper ballots or voter-verifiable paper audit trails (VVPAT): A physical record enables recounts and audits.
Chain-of-custody procedures: Two-person rules, tamper-evident seals, and logs.
Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing: Public pre-election tests of equipment and ballots.
Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs): Statistical checks that can catch and correct outcome-altering errors.
Public transparency: Observers from all parties, published procedures, and open audit reports.

For an expert consensus on best practices, see the National Academies’ report “Securing the Vote”: Securing the Vote.

Technology: Harden, Monitor, and Recover

Network segmentation: Keep election systems isolated from general county IT networks.
Application allowlisting and verified builds: Only approved software can run; hash checks verify integrity.
Endpoint detection and response (EDR): Detect suspicious behavior fast.
Patching and vulnerability management cycles before the election freeze.
Removable media controls: Signed media, scanning kiosks, and strict custody.
Backups and recovery drills: Offline, immutable backups tested in tabletop exercises.
Vendor security: Contractual requirements for incident reporting, secure development, and software bills of materials (SBOM).

Coordination matters. Election officials share indicators of compromise and alerts via EI-ISAC: EI-ISAC. CISA provides free services, assessments, and playbooks: CISA Election Security.

Quick Wins That Reduce Risk Fast

Turn on MFA everywhere; prioritize email, remote access, and cloud consoles.
Enforce least-privilege access and remove stale accounts.
Deploy phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 keys) for admins.
Freeze non-essential IT changes 30 days before Election Day.
Create a communications plan: who speaks, where results appear, and how to counter rumors.
Run a pre-election tabletop exercise with IT, operations, comms, and law enforcement.

What You Can Do as a Voter or Citizen

You don’t need a security badge to help protect elections.

Check your registration early using your official state website. Don’t rely on third-party links.
Learn your polling place, ID requirements, and options for early voting or mail voting.
Bring a sample ballot. It speeds things up and reduces errors.
Review your paper ballot carefully before casting. If there’s a voter-verifiable printout, read it.
If you see a problem at a polling place, report it to officials on-site. They have procedures to address issues.
Be mindful online:
Pause before sharing. Ask: Who is the source? What’s the evidence?
Cross-check with official election channels. Your state’s site and election office social accounts are the source of truth.
Beware of “urgent” claims about changed polling locations or rules. These are a common suppression tactic.
Consider serving as a poll worker. Training is robust, and you’ll see the checks and balances up close.

For myth-busting and “what’s normal” on Election Day, keep CISA’s Rumor Control handy: CISA Rumor Control. For research and practical insights, the MIT Election Data and Science Lab is excellent: MIT Election Lab.

Measuring and Communicating Trust

Security isn’t just controls; it’s also confidence. Officials can build trust by:

Pre-bunking: Explaining common processes and glitches before Election Day, so normal doesn’t look suspicious.
Publishing procedures and audits: Put the manuals and post-election audit results online.
Hosting public tests: Invite media and observers to L&A testing and to audits.
Communicating with clarity: Use plain language, consistent branding, and a single, authoritative voice across platforms.

It’s not enough to be secure. Voters need to see and understand the security.

The Road Ahead: AI, Deepfakes, and a Faster Threat Cycle

Elections evolve. So do threats. Three shifts to watch:

AI-generated content at scale
Expect more convincing forged audio and “just plausible enough” documents. Provenance tools like C2PA can help tie media to trusted sources, but adoption is early.
Zero Trust and memory-safe code
Election IT is moving toward “never trust, always verify” architectures and pushing vendors toward memory-safe languages to cut entire classes of exploits.
Supply chain transparency
SBOMs and secure-by-design procurement are becoming standard asks for election technology and services.

The goal isn’t to eliminate risk. It’s to make successful attacks unlikely, quickly detected, and recoverable without undermining public confidence.

Key Takeaways

Hackers target elections because outcomes are high-impact, systems are complex, and trust is fragile.
Changing votes at scale is hard. But disrupting logistics and spreading doubt is easier—and often the real objective.
Paper records, audits, and layered cyber defenses make a measurable difference.
Coordination through EI-ISAC and guidance from CISA, NIST, and the EAC help local officials raise the bar.
Voters play a role: verify information, follow official sources, and consider serving as a poll worker.
The next wave of challenges—AI and supply chain complexity—will be met with stronger transparency, provenance, and zero-trust practices.

If all of this feels like a lot, that’s normal. Elections are big, but so is the community protecting them. And that community includes you.

FAQ: Cybersecurity in Elections

Q: Are voting machines connected to the internet?
A: In most U.S. jurisdictions, no. Voting equipment is not connected during voting. Risks come from indirect paths like removable media and pre-election programming. Strong chain-of-custody and verification controls reduce that risk. See: CISA Rumor Control.

Q: Can hackers change votes without anyone noticing?
A: The combination of voter-verifiable paper records, public pre-election testing, and post-election audits makes undetected, outcome-changing tampering very unlikely—especially at scale. Risk-Limiting Audits are designed to detect and correct outcome-altering errors. Learn more: Securing the Vote.

Q: What’s the difference between misinformation and disinformation?
A: Misinformation is false but shared without intent to deceive. Disinformation is false and shared deliberately to mislead. Both can affect elections, but disinformation campaigns are coordinated and strategic. For research, see: Stanford Internet Observatory.

Q: What is a Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA)?
A: It’s a statistical audit that samples paper ballots to provide strong evidence the reported outcome is correct—or to trigger a full hand count if it’s not. RLAs scale with the margin of victory, making them efficient and powerful. Overview: EAC Resources.

Q: How do DDoS attacks affect elections?
A: They can slow or knock offline public-facing sites like Election Night Reporting pages. That doesn’t change official results, which are tabulated and certified through separate processes, but it can create confusion. Resilience plans route users to backups and official channels.

Q: What’s the best defense against disinformation as a voter?
A: Slow down. Check the source. Look for corroboration from official election offices. Be skeptical of “breaking” claims about changed polling locations or rules. When in doubt, go to your state’s official site or CISA’s hub: CISA Election Security.

Q: Who actually secures elections?
A: It’s a team effort: local election officials and IT staff, state authorities, federal partners like CISA, vendors, law enforcement, and civil society researchers. Information sharing happens via EI-ISAC: EI-ISAC.

Q: Do paper ballots really help?
A: Yes. Paper provides a human-readable record independent of software. With audits, paper enables verification and correction if needed. It’s a cornerstone of modern election security.

Final Thought

Protecting elections is about more than stopping hackers. It’s about building systems—and habits—that earn trust. The layers are working: better tech hygiene, paper records, audits, and faster, clearer communication. Keep learning, verify before sharing, and support your local election office. Democracy is a team sport.

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Cybersecurity and Elections: How Hackers Target the Vote—and How Democracies Fight Back

Why Elections Are Irresistible Targets for Hackers

How Modern Elections Actually Work (and Where the Risks Live)

Real-World Election Interference: What We’ve Seen

The Biggest Cyber Risks to Elections

Disinformation: The Silent Partner of Cyberattacks