The Internet of Bodies: Pacemakers, Implants, and Biohacking Devices—And the Cybersecurity Risks No One Should Ignore
What happens when a heartbeat depends on Wi‑Fi? It sounds like sci‑fi, but it’s here. Pacemakers, insulin pumps, cochlear implants, neurostimulators—even DIY biohacking chips—are online or near‑online today. This “Internet of Bodies” promises longer, healthier lives. It also raises a new kind of risk: when tech lives inside us, cybersecurity becomes a matter of life and death.
If you or a loved one uses a connected medical device, this guide is for you. I’ll break down what the Internet of Bodies (IoB) really is, where the risks are, and how doctors, researchers, and manufacturers are working to keep patients safe. I’ll also share practical steps you can take right now.
Let’s get to the heart of it—literally.
What Is the Internet of Bodies (IoB)?
The Internet of Bodies is the network of connected devices that monitor, diagnose, or treat the human body. Think of it in three layers:
- Wearables: fitness trackers, smartwatches, ECG patches, smart rings.
- Implantables: pacemakers, defibrillators, insulin pumps, neurostimulators, cochlear implants.
- Ingestibles and near-body tech: smart pills, continuous glucose monitors (CGMs), smart contact lenses, subdermal RFID/NFC chips.
Why it matters: – Continuous monitoring can catch problems early. – Closed-loop systems (like automated insulin delivery) can act faster than we can. – Remote care reduces hospital visits and keeps people at home. – Data from many patients can improve treatment and research.
Here’s the catch: all those benefits depend on radios, apps, cloud services, and software. And software can be attacked.
Real-World Examples: When Connected Devices Become Targets
Cybersecurity in healthcare isn’t theoretical. We have evidence—and not just from Hollywood.
- Pacemaker firmware update recall (Abbott/St. Jude, 2017). The FDA confirmed vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker in proximity to modify device settings. A firmware update reduced risk, but it required a clinic visit for many patients. Source: FDA safety communication.
- Insulin pump cybersecurity risks (Medtronic MiniMed, 2019). Older pumps used unencrypted wireless connections, allowing someone nearby to deliver unexpected insulin doses. Medtronic issued a recall and urged patients to switch to newer models. Source: FDA communication.
- Johnson & Johnson Animas OneTouch Ping (2016). Researchers disclosed a vulnerability that could allow remote bolus commands. J&J notified patients and offered mitigations. Source: Reuters coverage.
- Former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s pacemaker. His doctors disabled the wireless feature in 2007 to prevent a hypothetical assassination via hacking—years before mainstream awareness. Source: CBS News.
- Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) flaws in medical devices. The “SweynTooth” set of BLE vulnerabilities affected many SoCs used in wearables and health devices, enabling denial-of-service or code execution. Source: SweynTooth disclosure.
- Ransomware spillover. WannaCry didn’t target implants, but it crippled the UK’s National Health Service in 2017, delaying care and indirectly risking lives. Source: UK National Audit Office report.
These cases show two truths: 1) Vulnerabilities happen—even in life‑critical tech. 2) Coordinated disclosure and responsible patching can reduce harm.
Why Connected Implants Are Hard to Secure
Securing a hospital server is one thing. Securing a device that sits next to your heart is another. Here’s why.
- Tiny batteries, tight budgets. Crypto and radios burn power. Implants must last years, so designers minimize transmissions and compute. That limits security options.
- Patching isn’t easy. Many implants require a clinic visit to update safely. Some aren’t updateable at all. That means vulnerabilities can linger.
- Lifecycles are long. Medical devices can stay implanted for 5–15 years. Software stacks and crypto standards evolve much faster.
- Radios increase attack surface. Telemetry, programming wands, BLE, proprietary RF, NFC—each adds potential entry points.
- Safety vs. security trade-offs. In an emergency, a programmer may need immediate access. Requiring strict authentication could delay care. Designers balance “fail-safe” and “fail-secure”—with real lives at stake.
- Complex supply chains. Chips, radios, OS components, mobile apps, and cloud APIs come from different vendors. One weak link is enough.
- Clinical workflow. Devices must be easy for clinicians to use under pressure. Extra steps or passwords can introduce human error or slow treatment.
In short: the constraints are real. But that’s also why secure-by-design is so important from day one.
The Threat Landscape: How Attacks Could Happen
Not all threats look like a movie villain with a laptop outside your window. Most are mundane. Some are accidental. But all can affect safety or privacy.
- Unauthorized commands to a device. Change pacing rate, deliver an insulin bolus, or change neurostimulator settings. Usually requires proximity, specialized hardware, and a vulnerable device.
- Eavesdropping or spoofing over radio. Without encryption and authentication, nearby attackers can learn device IDs or replay messages.
- Denial-of-service and jamming. Flooding RF channels or crashing the device interface could stop monitoring or force a reboot.
- Rogue apps and cloud leaks. The companion app or cloud portal may have weaker controls than the implant itself. API keys in mobile apps, weak MFA, or misconfigured storage can expose sensitive health data.
- Supply chain exploits. Vulnerable BLE stacks, third-party libraries, or outdated OS components (e.g., known CVEs) embedded in devices.
- Physical access. Stolen programmers, default passwords on clinical consoles, or unsecured hospital ports.
- Ransomware in hospitals. The device may be fine, but if systems managing updates and records are down, care is delayed.
- Side channels and privacy exposure. Wearables can reveal heart rhythms, sleep, fertility, or location. Strava’s public heatmap once exposed sensitive military sites. Source: The Guardian.
The probability of a targeted implant attack is low for most people. But the impact could be catastrophic. That risk profile is unique.
Ethics and Privacy: When Your Body Is Online
The Internet of Bodies forces hard questions we can’t dodge.
- Who owns your body data? You? The device maker? Your insurer? If it’s stored in the cloud, can it be subpoenaed or sold?
- HIPAA does not cover everything. Health data in a hospital EHR is protected. But data from consumer wearables often isn’t—unless it’s handled by a covered entity. Learn more: HHS HIPAA overview.
- GDPR treats biometric and health data as sensitive. That adds rights for EU residents—like access and deletion—but only applies in certain contexts. See: GDPR guide.
- Consent and autonomy. Patients should understand remote features and data flows. Opt‑out should be easy without losing essential therapy.
- Equity and access. If secure devices cost more, do low‑income patients get stuck with less secure care?
- Biohacking and DIY medicine. Open APS projects and subdermal NFC chips enable creativity—and risk. Informed consent and community norms matter when regulators haven’t caught up.
Here’s why that matters: trust drives adoption. If people don’t trust the tech in their bodies, they won’t use it—even when it could save their lives.
How the Industry Is Working to Keep Patients Safe
The good news: there’s serious progress on governance, standards, and engineering. Highlights worth knowing:
Standards and guidance: – FDA premarket cybersecurity guidance (final 2023). Requires threat modeling, SBOMs, secure updates, and a plan to monitor and patch. Source: FDA guidance.
- FDA postmarket guidance (2016). Encourages coordinated disclosure and risk-based mitigations without over-penalizing manufacturers who patch responsibly.
- UL 2900 cybersecurity standard. Independent testing criteria for network-connectable products, including medical. Source: UL 2900 series.
- ISO 14971. Risk management for medical devices, adapted to cybersecurity risks. Source: ISO 14971.
- AAMI TIR57 and TIR97. Practical guidance on medical device security risk management. Source: AAMI TIR57.
- NIST resources for IoT security and SSDF secure development. Source: NIST IoT Program.
Engineering practices gaining traction: – Secure-by-design. Least privilege, memory-safe languages where possible, hardened protocols, and authenticated commands.
- Cryptography built in. Modern implants and wearables increasingly use strong, efficient crypto with device-specific keys and rolling nonces.
- Signed, testable updates. Over-the-air or in-clinic firmware updates with signatures and rollback protection.
- SBOMs. Transparent software bill of materials to track and patch vulnerable components faster.
- VDPs and bug bounties. Clear vulnerability disclosure programs and partnerships with security researchers.
- Clinical environment security. Network segmentation, asset inventories, and dedicated medical VLANs in hospitals.
- Human factors and safety cases. Holistic safety engineering that considers how security controls affect care in emergencies.
The direction of travel is clear: more transparency, more collaboration, and more continuous security.
A Quick Threat Model: What Could Go Wrong with a Pacemaker—and How to Mitigate It
Threat models turn “what ifs” into concrete engineering and clinical decisions. Let’s keep it simple.
Potential misuse cases: – An attacker near the patient sends unauthorized telemetry or reprogramming commands. – A malicious app harvests device data via a paired phone. – A stolen clinical programmer uses default credentials to access any device.
Mitigations that help: – Radio hardening. Use proximity-limited channels (e.g., inductive coupling) for privileged commands. Keep long-range RF telemetry read-only or rate-limited.
- Mutual authentication. Require the device and programmer to mutually verify with per-device keys. No global manufacturer passwords.
- Session protection. Rotate nonces and session keys, enforce short timeouts, and detect replay.
- Safe defaults. Disable nonessential radio features by default. Make emergency access explicit and logged.
- Update strategy. Signed firmware with a clear in-clinic update process, battery impact assessment, and patient communication plan.
- Audit and logging. Keep a privacy-preserving audit trail of access events that clinicians can review.
- Programmer security. Unique credentials, physical locks, and automatic logoff.
Clinician and patient practices: – Verify device and programmer pairing in the chart. – Educate patients on what normal remote check-ins look like (timing, app names). – Encourage strong phone security (screen lock, OS updates, no sideloading).
This is the balance: protect against abuse without blocking emergency care.
Biohacking and DIY Implants: Innovation at the Edge
The biohacking community pushes boundaries—sometimes ahead of regulators.
- DIY closed-loop insulin systems (OpenAPS, Loop) show impressive glycemic control for many users. But they’re not FDA‑cleared as packaged solutions, and users accept their own risk.
- Subdermal NFC/RFID chips can open doors or store emergency info. Security depends on the chip, app, and readers. Most are convenience devices, not medical implants—but they still interact with your body.
Tips if you’re exploring: – Understand the threat model. What happens if someone clones your tag? What if your phone is lost?
- Prefer open, well-reviewed projects with active communities.
- Keep devices updated and document your setup for emergency responders.
- Talk to a clinician—especially if you have other implants.
Personal note: Innovation often starts at the edges. But the body is not a beta test. Be bold and be careful.
Actionable Checklists
For patients and caregivers: – Ask your clinician: – What wireless features does my device use? – Does it receive updates? How and how often? – What should I expect from remote monitoring (calls, texts, app notifications)? – Secure your phone: – Use a passcode and enable automatic updates. – Install only the official companion app. – Turn on MFA for any cloud portal. – At home: – Place home transmitters where the manufacturer recommends. – Keep them updated; don’t ignore alerts. – On privacy: – Know where your data goes. Request a copy of the privacy policy. – If you’re uncomfortable with a feature, ask about opt‑out alternatives.
For clinicians and IT teams: – Inventory every connected medical device and its software version. – Segment networks; isolate medical VLANs and block unnecessary outbound traffic. – Enforce access controls on programmers and consoles; eliminate default passwords. – Subscribe to manufacturer and ICS‑CERT advisories; plan for coordinated patch windows. – Train staff to recognize legitimate remote checks and phishing related to device portals.
For manufacturers and startups: – Do threat modeling early; include safety engineering and human factors. – Ship with per-device keys, secure boot, signed updates, and a VDP. – Maintain an SBOM and monitor for vulnerable components. – Choose memory-safe languages where possible; fuzz your parsers and RF stacks. – Build a clinic-friendly update and rollback plan with clear patient messaging.
The Road Ahead: Safer by Default
Looking forward, several trends should make the IoB safer:
- On-device anomaly detection. Lightweight models can spot abnormal command patterns and shut down risky sessions.
- Energy-efficient crypto. New hardware and protocols bring strong security without draining batteries.
- Post-quantum readiness (eventually). Long-lived implants may need crypto agility to handle future standards.
- Better identity for devices. Standardized, verifiable device identities help hospitals manage fleets securely.
- Regulation with teeth. Expect more demand for SBOMs, timely patches, and transparent risk communications.
The future is not “no risk.” It’s “known, managed, and minimized risk”—with benefits that clearly outweigh the downsides.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What is the Internet of Bodies (IoB)? A: It’s the ecosystem of connected devices that monitor or interact with the human body—wearables, implants, and ingestibles. They connect via phones, home hubs, and cloud services to deliver care and collect data.
Q: Can someone hack a pacemaker? A: In practice, it’s rare and typically requires proximity, knowledge of a specific vulnerability, and specialized equipment. But vulnerabilities have been found and patched, which is why secure design and updates are critical. See the FDA 2017 pacemaker advisory.
Q: Are insulin pumps and CGMs safe to use? A: Yes, when used as directed and kept updated. Some older models had wireless vulnerabilities. Manufacturers and the FDA have provided mitigations and replacements. Discuss your specific model with your clinician and follow FDA safety communications.
Q: Does HIPAA protect data from my smartwatch? A: Not always. HIPAA covers data held by covered entities (like your healthcare provider). Data you share with a consumer app may not be protected the same way. Check the app’s privacy policy and consider your sharing settings. More from HHS.
Q: How do I secure my medical device at home? A: Use only official apps and transmitters, keep your phone and devices updated, enable MFA for portals, and follow your clinician’s guidance on remote monitoring. If something looks off—unexpected prompts or messages—call your care team.
Q: What should hospitals do first? A: Start with an accurate device inventory and network segmentation. Then implement access controls on programmers, subscribe to advisories, and establish a repeatable patch/mitigation process.
Q: What standards should manufacturers follow? A: FDA cybersecurity guidance (premarket and postmarket), ISO 14971 for risk management, UL 2900 for testing, AAMI TIR57 for security risk frameworks, and NIST secure development practices. Links: FDA, UL 2900, ISO 14971, AAMI TIR57, NIST IoT.
Q: Is biohacking legal? A: Laws vary. Many DIY projects are legal to experiment with on yourself, but not cleared as medical devices. If a device treats a medical condition, regulators may have a say. Know the rules in your region and talk to a clinician.
Bottom Line: Connected Care Is Worth It—If We Build and Use It Right
The Internet of Bodies is transforming healthcare—often for the better. Continuous monitoring, closed-loop therapy, and remote care save time and lives. But with connectivity comes responsibility. Security isn’t a feature to bolt on; it’s a clinical safety requirement.
If you’re a patient, ask questions and keep your setup updated. If you’re a clinician, push for inventory, segmentation, and training. If you build these devices, embrace secure-by-design and transparent communication.
Here’s the takeaway: trust is the most critical component in any implant. We earn it by designing for safety, updating responsibly, and treating patient data with respect.
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